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The Economic Effects of Dividend Taxation
ABSTRACT
This paper tests several competing hypotheses about the economic
effects of dividend taxation. It employs British data on security returns,
dividend payout rates, and corporate investment, because unlike the United
States, Britain has experienced several major dividend tax reforms in the last
three decades. These tax changes provide an ideal natural experiment for ana-
lyzing the effects of dividend taxes. We compare three different views of how
dividend taxes affect decisions by firms and their shareholders. We reject the
"taxcapitalization" view that dividend taxes are non—distortionary lump sum
taxes on the owners of corporate capital. We also reject the hypothesis that
firms pay dividends because marginalinvestors are effectively untaxed. We find
thatthe traditional view that dividend taxes constitute a "double—tax" on cor-
porate capital income is most consistent with our empirical evidence. Our
resultssuggest that dividend taxes reduce corporate investment and exacerbate
distortions in the intersectoral and intertemporal allocation of capital.
James M. Poterba Lawrence H. Summers
Department of' Economics Department of Economics
Massachusetts Institute of Technolor Harvard University and NBER
and NBER Cambridge, MA 02138
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617—253—6673The question of how taxes on corporate distributions affect econoniic
behavior is central to evaluating a number of major tax reform options.
Shifts towards either consumption taxation or corporate tax integration would
result in dramatic reductions in the taxes levied on dividend income. On the
other hand, movement towards a comprehensive income tax would raise the effec-
tive tax burden on dividends. While many financial economists have studied
the question of why firms pay dividends despite the associated tax penalties
imposed on many investors, no consensus has emerged as to the effects of divi-
dend taxation on firms' investment and financial decisions.
This paper summarizes our research program examining the empirical
validity of several widely held views about the economic effects of dividend
taxation. Empirical analysis of dividend taxation using American data is dif-
ficult, because there has been relatively little variation over time in the
relevant legislation. We therefore focus on empirical analysis of the British
experience since 1950, which has been characterized by four major reforms in
the taxation of corporate distributions. These reforms have generated
substantial variation in the effective marginal tax rate on dividend income,
and provide an ideal natural experiment for studying the economic effects of
dividend taxes.
At the outset, it is important to clarify why developing a con-
vincing model of the effects of dividend taxation has been so difficult for
economists. Straightforward analysis suggests that since some shareholders
are tax penalized when firms pay dividends instead of retaining earnings,
firms should not pay dividends. Dividend taxes should collect no revenue and
impose no allocative distortions. Even the most casual empiricism discredits
this analysis. The payment of dividends is a common and enduring practice of—2—
most large corporations, and it appears to result in substantial tax liabili-
ties for many investors. In modelling the effects of dividend taxes, it Is
therefore necessary to provide some account of why dividends are paid. Given
thesimple model's clear no—dividend prediction, any model which rationalizes
dividend payout will seem at least partly unsatisfactory. However, some
choice is clearly necessary if we are to make any headway towards
understanding the economic effects of dividend taxes.
We consider three competing views of how dividend taxes affect decisions
by firms and shareholders. They are not matually exclusive, and each could be
relevant to the behavior of some firms. The first view, which we label the
"tax irrelevance view," argues that contrary to naive expectations, dividend
paying firms are not penalized in the marketplace.1 It holds that in the
United States, because of various nuances in the tax code, marginal investors
donot require extra pretax returns to induce them to hold dividend—paying
securities. Some personal investors are effectively untaxed on dividend
income.Other investors, who face high transactions costs or are non—taxable
but face limitations on expenditures from capital, find dividends more attrac-
tive than capital gains for non—tax reasons. These investors demand dividend—
paying securities. If this view is correct and dividend—paying firms are not
penalized, then there is no dividend puzzle. Moreover, changes in dividend
tax rates or dividend policies should affect neither the total value of any
firm nor its investment decisions. Dividend taxes are therefore nondistor—
'Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982) are the principalexponents of
this view.—3—
tionary. The tax irrelevance view implies that reducing dividend taxes would
have no effect on share values, corporate investment decisions, or the
economy's long—run capital stock.
A second view regarding the dividend payout problem, which also
holds that dividend taxes do not have distortionary effects,may be called the
"tax capitalization hypothesis."2 The premise of this view is that theonly
way for mature firms to pass money through the corporate veil is by paying
taxable dividends. The market value of corporate assets is thereforeequal to
the present value of the after—tax dividends which firms areexpected to pay.
Moreover, because these future taxes are capitalized into share values, share-
holders are indifferent between policies of retaining earnings orpaying
dividends. On this view, raising dividend taxes would result in an immediate
decline in the market value of corporate equity. However, dividend taxes have
no impact on a firm's marginal incentive to invest. They are essentially lump
sum taxes levied on the initial holders of corporate capital, with no distor—
tionary effects on real decisions. The tax capitalization view implies that
reducing dividend taxes would confer windfall gains on corporate shareowners,
without altering corporate investment incentives.
A third, and more traditional, view of dividend taxes treats themas
additional taxes on corporate profits.3 Despite the heavier tax burdenon
2Although this view is linked with the long—standing notion of
"trapped" equity in the corporate sector, it has been formalized by Auerbach
(1979), Bradford (1981), and King (1977).
3mis is the implicit view ofmany proponents of tax integration;
see, for example, McClure (1977)._14_
dividends than on capital gains, firms are rewarded for paying dividends. The
explanation for this reward is unclear; managerial signalling could provide one
rationale. Therefore, in spite of their shareholders' higher taxliability,
firms can be indifferent to marginal changes in their dividendpayments. This
view suggests that the relevant ax burden for firms consideringmarginal
investments is the total tax levied on investment returns at both thecor-
porate and the personal level. Dividend tax reductions both raise share
values and provide incentives for capital investment, becausethey lower the
pre—tax return which firms are required to earn. Dividend tax changes would
therefore affect the economy's long run capital intensity.
Our empirical work is directed at evaluating each of these three
views of dividend taxation. The results suggest that the "traditional" view
of dividend taxation is most consistent with British post—war dataon security
returns, payout ratios, and investment decisions. While the effects of dividend
taxes need not be parallel in the United States and the United Kingdom,our
results are strongly suggestive for the United States.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section I lays out the three
alternative views of dividend taxation in greater detail, and discusses their
implications for the relationship between dividend taxes and corporate invest—
ment and dividend decisions. Section II describes the nature and evolution of
the British tax system in some detail. The "natural experiments"provided by
post—war British tax reforms provide the basis for our subsequent empirical
tests. Section III presents evidence on how tax changes affect investors'
relative valuation of dividends and capital gains by focusing on "ex—dividend"—5—
share price novements in the United Kingdom. Our results show that tax rates
do appear to influence the value of dividend income. Section IV extends this
analysis by examining share price changes in nonths when dividend tax reforms
were announced, presenting further evidence that tax rates affect security
valuation. Tests of the alternative theories' implications for the effects of
dividend tax changes on corporate payout policies are presented in Section V.
We find that dividend tax changes do affect the share of profits which firms
choose to distribute. Section VI focuses directly on investment decisions,
testing which view of dividend taxation best explains the time series pattern
of British investment. Finally, in Section VII we discuss the implications of
our results for tax policy and suggest several directions for future
research.—6—
I.Three Views of Dividend Taxation
The irrelevance of dividend policy in a taxiess world has been
recognized since Miller and Modigliani's (1961) pathbreaking work. If share-
holders face differential tax rates on dividends and capital gains, however,
then the irrelevance result may rio longer hold. Dividend policymay affect
shareholder wealth, and shareholders may not be simultaneously indifferent
to investments financed from retained earnings and investments financed
from new equity issues.
To illustrate these propositions, we consider the after—tax return
which a shareholder with marginal tax rates of m and z on dividends and capi-
tal gains, respectively, receives by holding shares In a particular firm)
Theshareholder's after—tax return Ris
D V° -V /' t/' , t+1t 1.1) Rt =.l_m)V—
+'il—zn, t t
where Dt is the firm's dividend payment, V is the total value of the firm
in period t, and is the period t+1 value of the shares outstanding in
period t. To focus on tax—related aspects of the firm's problem, we shall
ignore uncertainty, treating V1 as known at time t.5 The total value of the
firm at t+1 Is
Thetax rate z is the marginal effective tax rate on capital
gains, as definedby-King (1977). Since gains are taxed on realization, not
accrual,z isthe expected value of the tax liabilitywhich is induced by a
capital gain accruing today.
5A closely related model which incorporates uncertainty and invest-
ment adjustment costs is solved in Poterba and Summers (1983).—7—
(12) v—v0 t+l_ t+1 t
where V equals new shares issued in period t. Equation (1.1)can be rewritten,










It nay be solved forward, subject to the transversality condition
(1.5) urn(i +P)_Tv=
T- z
to obtain an expression for the value of the firm:
(1.6) = + 121i [(ii)D —
V+j1.
The total value of the firm is the present discounted value of after—tax divi-
dends, less the present value of new share issues which current shareholders
would be required to purchase in order to maintain their claim on a constant
fraction of the firm's total dividends and profits.
Before turning to consider the different views of dividend taxation,
we shall sketch the firm's optimization problem. The firm's objective is
to maximize its market value, subject to several constraints. The first is
its cash flow identity:—8—
(1.7) (1_T)lIt + = +
where is pretax profitability and I gross investment expenditures and I
isthe corporate tax rate. ll = whereKt is the capital stock at the
beginning of period t.6 Next, thre is an equation describing the evolution of
the firms'capitalstock:
(1.8)Kt=Kti+It.
We assume that there is no depreciation, and ignore adjustment costsor the
possible irreversibility of investment. Finally, there are restrictions
on the firm's financial policies: dividends cannot be negative,
and new share issues riust be greater than some minimal level VN,7
reflecting restrictions on the firm's ability to repurchase shares or toengage






Beforeformally solving for the firm's investment and financial
plan, we observe one important feature of any solution to this problem. The
6We consider the firm's problem in discretetime to avoid the dif-
ficulties of infinite investment over short time intervals which would result
in a continuous—time model without adjustment costs.
TShare repurchases are possible tosome extent in the United
States. However, regular repurchasin can lead to IRS actionstretin the repurchase as a aividend. In Briain, where share repurcriase is explicitly—9—
firm would never simultaneously issue new equity andpay dividends. If a firm
sets both Dt >0and >inany period, then there would exist a feasible
perturbation in financial policy which would not affect investmentor profits
in any period but would raise share values. Thisperturbation involves a
reduction in dividends, compensated for by a reduction Innew share issues.
To vary dividends and new share issues withoutaffecting ' or we require
(i.ii)dV =
Fromequation (1.6), the change in share value caused by a dividendchange in




Ifm exceeds z, reducing dividends whenever feasible will raise
Vt.
Since this perturbation argument applies atany positive level of
dividends, it establishes that firms with sufficient profits tocover invest-
ment needs should reduce new share issues and repurchase shares to theextent
possible. For some firms, I may exceed (l_T)llt, and there will be new share
issues. Even if m >z,therefore, some new equity may be issued. Similarly,
some firms may have too few investments to fully utilize their currentpro-
fits. If feasible, these firms should repurchase their shares.Only after
exhausting tax—free distribution channels should these firmspay dividends.
banned, these questions do not arise. The situation is nirecomplex when tran-
sactions equivalent to share repurchase, such as directportfolio investments,
are considered.—10—
No firm, however, should ever operate on both the dividend and share issue
margins simultaneously. The "dividend puzzle" consists of the observation
that some firms pay dividends while also having unused opportunities to
repurchase shares or engage in equivalent transactions which would effectively
transmittax—free income to sharLholders. Edwards (l98) reports that in a
sample of large British firms, over 25 percent paid dividends and issued new
equityinthe same year, while 17 percent not only paid butraisedtheir divi-
dends during years when they issued new shares.
The conclusions described above apply when there is only one share-
holder and his tax rates satisfy m >z.However, the actual economy is
characterized by many different shareholders, often with widely different tax
rates. While m may exceed z for some shareholders, there are many investors
for whom m =zand still others facing higher tax rates on capital gains than
on dividends.8 If there were no short selling constraints, then as Brennan
(1970) and Gordon and Bradford (1980) show, there would be a unique market—wide
preference for dividends in terms of capital gains. It would equal a weighted
average of different investor's tax rates, with higher weights on wealthier,
and less risk averse, investors. If there are constraints, however, then dif-
ferent firms may face different investor clienteles, possibly characterized by
different tax rates. If some traders face low transactions costs (Miller and
Scholes (1982), Kalay (1982)) or are nearly risk neutral, then theymay effec-
tively determine the market's relative valuation of dividends and capital
gains and become the marginal investors.
The firm chooses I' V, Kt, and Dt to maximizeVt subject to
8The principal class of American investors for whomm is less than
z is corporate holders of common stock, who may exclude 85 percent of their
dividend income from their taxable income, thereby facing a tax rate of .15 x—11—
(1.7), (1.8), (1.9) and (i.io). The firm's problem ny be rewritten as





where Xt, and are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints. The first order necessary conditions for an optimal program are:






—1 — —= 0 n(V_V)0
(1.17)D:()+ t—t
=0 tDt 0.
By interpreting these conditions under the different views of dividend taxa-
tion, we can isolate the implications of each for the effects of dividend
taxation on the cost of capital, investment, payout policy, and security
returns.
l.A. The Tax Irrelevance View
The first view of dividend taxation which we consider assumes that
share prices are set by investors for whom m =z.We label this the "tax
irrelevance" view; it wasadvancedby Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982). Miller
.b6 =.069,while being taxed at a 28 percent rate on their realized capital
gains.—12—
and Scholes argue that the marginal investor In corporate equities Is effec-
tively untaxed on both dividends arid capital gains income.9 Hamada and
Scholes (l981.), who call this view the "Before Tax Theory," note that it
essentially assumes "that all personal income taxes —tobondholders,
stockholders, and partners of businesses —canbe effectively laundered."
Several scenarios could lead to marginal investors being untaxed on
capital income. The marginal investor may be an institutional investor for
whom in =z=0.Alternatively, in the United States, the marginal investor
may be an individual investor for whom dividend income relaxes the deduction
limit for interest expenses, making m effectively zero. This investormight,
as a result of tax—minimizing transactions such as holding shares with
gains and selling shares with losses, also face a zero tax rate on capital
gains.
The interpretation of first order conditions (1.l)—(l.l7) in the
m=z=0 case is straightforward. The last two constraint conditionssimplify
substantially. As long as the firm is either paying dividends or issuing
shares, one of or the shadow values of the Dt and constraints, will
equal zero. Using either (1.16) or (1.17), and in= z=0,this implies that
=—1.The value of one dollar of additional profits is just one dollar.
The shadow value of capital, At, can be determined from (l.l4). Since — =
wecan conclude that At =1.The shadow value of one more unit of capital
in place, A, corresponds to "marginal q" in the investment literature. Firms
invest until the incremental increase in their market value from a one dollar
investment is exactly one dollar, regardless of the source of their marginal
9Another case in which the market would exhibitan indifference
betweendividends and capital gainsis when themarginal investoris a broker
ordealerin securities, facing equal (but non—zero) tax rates on both divi——13—
investment funds.
The knowledge that = = 1enables us to solve equation (1.15)
for the equilibrium marginal product of capital:
(1.18) (1_t)I1'(K) =
TheTaylor expansion of p/(1+p) around p =0allows us to approximate the
right hand side of this expression by p, yielding the standard result that
(1_T)1L'(Kt) =p.We define the cost of capital as the value of ll'(K) which
just satisfies (1.18), and using the approximation find
(1.19) C =(l—t)
The firm's cost of capital is independent of its payoutpolicy. Chanes in
the corporate tax rate will affect investment decisions.However, investment
policy will 'beindependentof both the firm's dividend payout choices and the
prevailing nominal dividend tax rate, since it is always effectively reduced
to zero by tax—wise investors. Assuming that mz=0 for the marginal investor
leads immediately to Miller and Modigliani's (1961) irrelevance result fora
taxiess world.
The tax irrelevance view also implies that the risk—adjusted
required return on all equity securities is equal, regardless of their divi-
dend yield. Assuming that all returns are certain, basic capital market
equilibrium condition is1°
dends and short term capital gains.
10The extension to the CAPM framework whichincorporates risk is
straightforward and involves replacing p withrf + j(rm_rf) where r1 is the
post—tax risk free return, is firm i's beta, andrm is the expected post—




where d1 is the dividend yield andg the expected capital gain on security i.
There should be no detectable differences in the returnson different shares
as a result of firm dividend policies.
The assumption that m=z=0 for marginal investors isultimately
verifiable only from empirical study. Some evidence, suchas the somewhat
controversial finding that on ex—dividend days share prices declineby less
than the value of their dividends, suggests that themarginal investor may not
face identical tax rates on dividends and capital gains. The taxirrelevance
view also has difficulty explaining the substantial amount ofdividend tax
revenue collected by both the Internal Revenue Service and (in the U.K.) the
Board of Inland Revenue. If most personal investorswere effectively untaxed
on dividend receipts, relatively little tax revenue should be raised.
The second and third views of dividend taxation assume thatshares
are valued as if the marginal investor faced a higher effective tax rateon
dividends than on capital gains. They attempt to explainwhy, in spite of
this tax disadvantage, dividends are still observed. We label thenext two
views the "tax capitalization" and the "traditional" views. Eachyields
different predictions about how the cost of capital,investment, and dividend
policy are affected by dividend taxation.
I.B The Tax Capitalization View
The "tax capitalization view" of dividend taxes wasdeveloped by
Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and King (1977). Itapplies to mature firms
which have after—tax profits in excess of their desired investmentexpen——15—
ditures. Retained earnings are therefore the marginal source of investment
funds for these firms. This view assumes that firms cannot find tax—free
channels for transferring income to shareholders so that the =
constraintbinds. Therefore, the firm pays a taxable dividend equal to the
excess of profits over investment:
(1.21) D =(l_t)1L
—+ VN.
Dividends are determined as a residual.
The first order conditions (l.114)—(l.1T) can be reinterpreted for a
firm in this situation. We showed above that a firm which was paying divi—
N N dends would repurchase shares to the maximum extent possible, so Vt =V
Formally,the knowledge that Dt >0allows us to set =0in (1.17), implying
=— [(l—m)/(l—z)1.The marginal value of a unit of capital, from equation
(1.114), is therefore
(1.22) At = < 1.
Marginal ci is less than one in equilibrium. Firms invest until investors are
indifferent at the margin between receiving additional dividend payments and
reinvesting money within the firm. When the firm pay-s a one dollar dividend,
the shareholder receives (1—rn) after tax. If the firm retains the dollar and
purchases capital, its share value will appreciate by q and the shareholder
will receive (l—z)q in after—tax income. If the shareholder is indifferent
between these two actions, the equilibrium value of marginal q must equal
i(1—m)/(l—z)]—16—
The cost of capital under the tax capitalization view can be derived
from equation (1.15). It will depend on both the current marginal source of
investment finance, and on the source which is expected to be available in
period t+i)1 This is because which depends upon whether retentions or
new share issues are next period's "rginal source of funds, affects the cost
of capital in period t. The assumption in the tax capitalization view is that
mature firms will never again issue new shares and always set =VN,so that
marginal source of funds in this and all future periods is retained earnings.
We can therefore set =+l
=(1—m)/(1—z),and find that
(1 (a.T)1T'tK)
—p/(1—z) —' t — 1 + p/(l—zY
Again using a Taylor approximation to the right hand side, the cost of capital
can be written
II — p c —__________
Thedividend tax rate has no effect on the cost of capital, and permanent
changes in dividend taxes, unless accompanied by changes in the capital gains
tax, will have no effect on investment activity.
This view implies that the dividend tax is a lump sum levy on wealth
in the corporate sector at the time of its imposition. The total value of
corporate equity, using (1.6) and defining Dt÷j as the dividends paid to
period t shareholders in period t+j,
'1More complete discussions of the importance of the marginal
source of funds over time may be found in King (19Th), Auerbach (1983b, pp.
921_5), and Edwards and Keen (l981).(1 25)V =(-) (1+_.E_YJD' t l—z l—z t+j
Changes in the dividend tax rate therefore have direct effects on the total
value of outstanding equity,12 even though they do not affect the rate of return
earned on these shares. The tax capitalization view treats current equity as
"trapped" within the corporate sector, and therefore as bearing the full bur-
den of the dividend tax.
Permanent changes in the dividend tax rate will have no effect
on the firm's dividend policy. The cost of capital, hence the firm's invest-
ment and capital stock, are unaffected by dividend taxes. Dividend payments,
the difference between (1_T)JI(Kt) and investment expenditures, are therefore
unaffected as well. Temporary tax changes, however, do have real effects.
For example, consider a temporary dividend tax which is announced in period
t—1. It will set the dividend tax rate to m in period t, but zero in all pre-
vious and subsequent periods. We set z =0in all periods for convenience.
Since A =1—rnbut =1for all we can use equation (1.15) to deter-
mine the period—by—period cost of capital around the tax change:
Period
Cost of Capital
t—2 t—1 t t+1
p p4-rn p—rn p
l—t l—t 1—i
The general formula for the cost of capital is
— iT—
121f the desired wealth to income ratio is fixed, then raising
dividend tax rates may actually raise equilibrium capital intensity by reducing
the portfolio value of each unit of physical capital. The discussion in the
text precludes this possibility by assuming that p is fixed.—18—
(1.26) c =(1_T)_1Ii —(i-i- Y1(x/x)1
The cost of capital depends in part on the change in the shadow value of capi-
tal which is expected to take place between one period and the next. Since
is low because of the dividend t- x, the cost of capital is high in the
period immediately prior to the imposition of' the tax, and low during
the taxed period. Since changes in the cost of capital have real effects,
temporary tax changes may alter investment and therefore dividend payout.
This result may be seen intuitively. Firms will go to great lengths to avoid
paying dividends during a temporary dividend tax period. As a conseciuence,
they will invest even in very low productivity investments.
Finally, since the capitalization view assumes that dividends face
higher tax rates than capital gains, it predicts that shares which pay divi-
dends will earn a higher pre—tax return to compensate shareholders for their
tax liability. The after—tax capital market line corresponding to (1.20) is
(1.27) p =(1_m)di
+(l—z)g.
which can be rewritten as
(1.28) R. = +
1 1—z1—z 1
where =d
+g1.There should be detectable differential returns on
securitieswith different dividend yields.
There are two principal difficulties with the capitalization view of
dividendtaxation. First, if marginal q is less than one and marginal and
average q are not very different, then firms should always prefer acquiring—19—
capital by takeovers instead of direct purchases. This is because the
purchase price of a new capital good is unity, but the market value of capital
goods held by other corporations is only (1—in)/(l--z).
Second, this view's premise is that dividends are the only way to
transfer moneyout of thecorporate sector. Firms are constrained in that
theycannot further reduce new equity issues or increase share repurchases.
In the U.S. at least, there are many methods potentially available to firms
which wish toconvert earnings into capital gains. These include both share
repurchases and takeovers, as well as the purchase ofequity holdings or debt
inother firms and various other transactions. The proposition that all
marginal distributions must flow through the dividend channel may be unte-
nable. The tax capitalization view therefore does not explain dividend payout
in any real sense. Rather it assumes that dividends must be paid and that
firms are not issuing new shares and then analzses the effect of changes in
dividend tax rates.
A further difficulty is this view's assumption that dividend
payments are a residual in the corporate accounts, and therefore subject to
substantial variation. The arrival of "good news," which raises desired
investment, should lead dividends to fall sharply. Most empirical evidence13
suggests both that dividend payments are substantially less volatile than
investment expenditures, and that managers raise dividends when favorable
information about the firm's future becomes available.
13The survey evidence reported by Lintner (1956) and the
regression evidence in Fama and Babiak (1968) suggest that managers adjust
dividend payments slowly in response to new information.—20—
I.C TheTraditional View
The third view of dividend taxation, which we label the "traditional"
view, takes a more direct approach to resolving the dividend puzzle. It
argues that for a variety of reasons, shareholders derive benefits from the
payment of dividends. Firms deriv, some advantage from the use of cash divi-
dends as a distribution channel, and this is reflected in their marketvalue.
While the force which makes dividends valuable remainsunclear, leading expla-
nations include the "signalling" hypothesis, discussed forexample by Ross
(1977), Bhattacharya (1979), arid Miller and Rock (1983), or the needto
restrict managerial discretion as outlined in Jensen and Meckling (1976).
To model the effect of the payout ratio on shareholder's valuationof
the firm, we mast generalize our earlier analysis. A convenient devicefor
allowing for "intrinsic dividend value" is to assume that the discount rate
applied to the firm's income stream depends on the payout ratio: p =
p'<0.Firms which distribute a higher fraction of their profits
are rewarded with a lower required rate of return. This changes the
fundamental expression for the value of the firm, equation (1.6), to
(1.29) Vt =(t,j)[(Z)Dt+j —V•j1
where
i—i D
(1.30) (t,j) =II [1 +P((1_) )/(iz)V1.
k=—1 t+k
While dividend taxes make dividend payments unattractive, the reduction in
discount rates which results from a higher payout ratiomay induce firms to—21—
pay dividends.
The first—order conditions characterizing the firm's optimalprogram
are slightly different in this case than under the previous two views, because
the choice of dividend policy now affects the discount rate. The new first
order conditions are shown below:
(1.l1a) += 0





(1.l6a) V: —l — — = C,
n(v_VN)0
Dt •i
(l T)II 11(1 t)
(1.lTa) +t
—t(l—z)(l +p/(l-z) Vt =0, tDt c0
For convenience, we define =P(D/(l_T)llt),so the discount rate in each
period depends on the previous period's payout ratio.
To solve these equations for rginal q and the cost of capital, we
assume that the returns from paying dividends are sufficient to makeDt >
Ifthis were not the case, then this view would reduce to the tax
capitalization del where dividends are just a residual. Positive
1141f despite the fact that p' <0firms continued to set Dt =0at
the optimum, the analysis would be siailar to the tax capitalization model.—22—
dividendsrequire =0,so =—lfrom (1.16a) and A 1 from (l.1la).
Therefore, the equilibrium value of marginal q is unity. Thisfollows,
because at the margin firms are effectively relying onnew equity finance.
Investors are trading one dollar of after—tax income forone dollar
of corporate capital. For values o q less than unity, thesetransactions
would cease.
The cost of capital can also be derived from these conditions.
Since =—1,equation (l.lTa) may be rewritten as
D
,(t ', P
V z—m t t l.3lj __ . ______
1—z p II 1—T
(l—z)(l +____t
Thisexpression maybeused to simplify (l.15a):





















Dt/(1_t)JE,the dividend payout ratio. The steady state cost of
capitalis therefore—23—
(35) = p(cx) C(l-T)1(l-m)cz+(i-z)(i-a)[
It involves a weighted average of the tax rates on dividends and capital gains,
with weights equal to the dividend payout ratio.
The cost of capital will also be affected by a dividend tax change.
The precise effect may be found by differentiating (l.31):
(136) dc= —ctc dcx
d(1—mD L(1—m)cx +(i—z)(i—aTf act d(1—m)
ac The foregoing conditions for choice of Dt imply—= 0at the optimal
dividend payout so we can write
(1 37) dc•(l—m)= —(l—m)a <a
d(l—rn) c (l—m)cx +(1—z)(l—cx)
A reduction in the dividend tax will therefore lower the cost of capital,
increasing current investment spending.
The traditional view implies that when the dividend tax rate falls,
equilibrium capital intensity and the required return p may rise. Under the
extreme assumption that capital is supplied inelastically, the only effect of a
dividend tax cut is an increase in the equilibrium rate of return, p. If capi-
tal was supplied with some positive elasticity, then a reduction in the dividend
tax rate would raise both capital intensity and the rate of return.'5 Dividend
tax changes can have substantial allocative effects.
The traditional view suggests that as dividend taxes fall, the divi-
dend payout ratio should rise. The firm equates the marginal benefit from divi—
151n the partial equilibrium rctdel described here, the supply of
capital is perfectly elastic at a rate of return p(cx). Therefore, the whole
adjustment to the new equilibrium would involve changes in capital intensity.—214W
dendpayments with the marginal tax cost of those payments. Dividend tax
reductions, whether temporary or permanent, will lower the marginal cost of
obtaining signalling or other benefits, and the optimal payout ratio should
therefore rise.
Finally, we should note t'-ie implications of this view for the rela-




Thisimplies two effects for dividend yield. First, in periods when firm I
actually pays dividends (d > 0), the measured pre—tax return will rise to
compensateinvestors for their resulting tax liability. However, even in
periods when no dividend is paid, the required return on higher yield stocks
may be lower than on low yield stocks as a result of the signalling or other
value which payout provides.
While it may provide an explanation of the dividend puzzle, the tra-
ditional view depends critically on a clear reason for investors to valuehigh
dividend payout, but as yet provides only weak motivation for the p(a) func—
tio.l6 It isparticularly difficult to understand whyfirmsuse cash dividends
as opposed to less heavily taxed meansofcommunicating information to their
shareholders. An additional difficulty with this view is that firms rarely
issue new equity. It is possible that even though firms issue shares infre-
quently, however, new equity is still the marginal source of funds. For
l6Black (1976), Stiglitz (1980), andEdwards (l98t) discuss many
of the proposed explanations for "intrinsic dividend value'T and find themunsa-
tisfactory in some dimension.—25—
example, some firms might use short—term borrowing to finance projects in
years when they do not issue equity, and then redeem the debt when they
finally issue new shares. Moreover, the wide variety of financial activities
described above which are equivalent to share repurchase mayallowfirms to
operate on the equity—issue margin without ever selling shares.
I.D Summary
Inthis section, we have described three distinct views of the economic
effects of dividend taxation. While we have treated them as opposing alter-
natives, they may each be partially correct. Different firms may be on dif-
ferent financing margins, and the tax rates on marginal investors may also
differ across firms. We allow for both these possibilities in interpreting
the empirical results reported below.
Table 1 summarizes the cost of capital and equilibrium "q" under
each of the alternative views. We also report each view's prediction for the
responsiveness of investment, the payout ratio, and the pretax return premium
earned by dividend—paying shares to a permanent increase in the dividend tax
rate. In subsequent sections, we test each of these different predictions using
British data from the post—war period.—26—
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Note: These results are derived in the text and are recorded here for later
reference. The level of investment is I, m is the marginal dividend tax
rate, and a is the dividend payout ratio. All of the tax changes are
assumed to be permanent.—27—
II. The Taxation of Dividends in Great Britain: 1950—1983
The previous section's stylized discussion of taxes focused on the
United States' tax environment. Since our empirical tests rely on the major
changes in British tax policy that have occurred over the last three decades,
this section describes the evolution of the U.K. tax system with respect to
dividends. Subsequent sections present ourempiricalresults.
In the United States, discriminatory taxation of dividends and retained
earnings occurs at the shareholder level, where dividends and capital gains
are treated differently. In Britain, however, there have been some periods
when corporations also faced differential tax rates on their retained and
distributed income. During other periods, the personal and corporate tax
systems were "integrated" to allow shareholders to receive credit for taxes
which had been paid at the corporate level. Between 1965 and l9T3, Britain
experimented with a tax system structured after that of the post—war United
States. Five different systems of dividend taxation iave been tried in Britain
during the last three decades.
Two summary parameters are needed to describe the effects of the
various tax regimes on dividends. The first, which measures the amount of the
tax discrimination at the shareholder level, is the investor tax preference
ratio (6). It is defined as the after—tax income which a shareholder receives
when a firm distributes a one pound dividend, divided by his after—tax
receipts when the firm's share price rises by one pound.17 In the United
States, 6 =(l—m)/(l—z).The investor tax preference ratio is central to ana—
1TFor consistency, in our section on ex—dividend price changes it
will prove helpful to focus on the dividend announced by the firm. Prior to
March, 1973, that was the gross dividend in the notation of King (1977). After
1973, it was the netdividend.We define S relative to the announced dividend.—28—
lyzingshare price movements around ex—dividend days, since if m and z are the
tax rates reflected in s.rket prices, then a firm paying a dividend of d
should experience a price drop of (l—m)/(1—z)d or ód.
The second parameter which rry affect investment and payout deci-
sions is the total tax preference atio (o).Itis defined as the amount of
after—tax income which shareholders receive when a firm uses one pound of
after—tax profits to increase its dividend payout. This return must be
measured relative to the amount of after—tax income which shareholders would
receive if the firm retained this pound. In the American tax system, where cor-
porate tax payments are unaffected by payout policy, U =(l—m)/(l—z).In
Britain, the relationship is more complex, depending on the change in corporate
tax payments which results from a one pound reduction in gross dividends. This
variable determines firm payout policy under the traditional view of dividend
taxation and equilibrium q under the tax capitalization hypothesis.
II.A. The Different Tax Regimes
To characterize the changes in 5 and 0 which provide the basis for
our empirical tests, we consider each British tax regime in turn. We follow
King (197T) and express the total tax burden on corporate income as a function
of the prevailing tax code parameters, and then derive 6 and 0. More detailed
discussions of British dividend taxation may be found in King (19T7), House of
Commons (1971), the Corporation Tax Green Paper (1982), and Tiley (1978).
King (1977) follows a different procedure for the post—1973 regime. Although
thisleads to some semantic differences, the results with respect to eare
identical.—29—
1950—51: Differential Profits Tax Regime I
Prior to the 1952 Budget, firms faced a two—tier tax system with dif-
ferent tax rates on distributed and undistributed income. The tax code was
described by s, the standard rate of income tax, T,thetax rate on undistri—
buted profits, and t,thetax rate on distributed profits. There was no
capital gains tax, so z—0. Corporations were subject to both income taxes and
profits taxes, although profits taxes could be deducted from a company's
income in calculating income tax liability. Income tax was paid at rate s.
The corporate tax liability of a corporation with pre—tax profits II and gross
dividend payments D wasl8
(2.1) TC =Es+(l—s)T](fl—D) +(1—s)tD u d
=[(l—s)t+sill+[(1_s)(Td
—t)—slD
In addition, shareholders were liable for
(2.2) =nD.
Inpractice, partofthis tax was collected by the corporation when it paid
dividends; it withheld sO as prepayment of part of the shareholder's tax.
Shareholders therefore received (l—s)D immediately after a gross dividend D
was paid. A taxpayer whose marginal rate was greater than s would sub-
sequently be liable for taxes of (m—s)D; one with m<s would receive a refund.
The investor tax preference ratio for this system is easy to derive.
The shareholder's after—tax income associated with a one pound dividend equals
l8The term gross dividends refers to dividends receivedby share-
holders prior to paying shareholder taxes, but after the payment of all cor-
porate taxes. Note that King (19171 uses G to represent gross dividends, and
D for net dividends. We use D for gross dividends.—30—
(i—rn), where m is the marginal dividend tax rate. Since thereare no taxes on
capital gains, the shareholder tax preference ratio is 6 =(1—rn).
We can also compute 0 for this tax regime. To raisegross dividends
by one pound, the firm must forego 1 +dTC/dD1pounds of after—tax reten-
tions, The second term is the marginal change in tax liability whichresults
from raising D by one pound. The parameter 0, which is thechange in gross
dividends per pound of foregone retentions, is defined as
(2.3) = 1 = 1
dTC (l)(i +— I ) l+- d u
from (2.2). The total tax preference ratio is definedby
(2.) =60=
(i_s)(iJd_TY
For most investors who paid taxes at rates above the standard rateof income
tax, the tax system discriminated against dividend payout. In addition,
exceeded sometimes by as much as forty percentage points.
1952—58: Differential Profits Tax egime II
The tax law was changed in 1952 to eliminate the deduction ofprofit
taxes from income subject to income tax. The analysis of this taxregime clo-
sely parallels that above. This system required the firm topay
(2.5) TC =Es+t](fl—D)+
TdD
=(S + t)il +
whilefor shareholders (2.2) continued to hold. The payment of aone pound
gross dividend would again provide the shareholder with (1—rn) pounds of after—
tax income, so 6 =(1—rn).Following the earlier expression for 0 we find—31—
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This tax system was less favorable to the payment of dividends than the pre-
vious regime had been, since by eliminating deductability of profits tax it
increased the burden induced by differential corporate profits tax rates.
1958_19614: Single—rate Profits Tax
In 1958, Chancellor Barber Amory announced a major reform in cor-
porate taxation. The differential profits tax was replaced by a single—rate
profits tax: all profits were taxed at the rate Tregardless of a firm's
dividend policy. In addition, the firm was liable for income tax at rate s on
its undistributed earnings, while it withheld sG for shareholders' income tax
liability on the dividends it distributed. Shareholders were still taxed at
rate m on gross dividends, but since firms were not subject to income tax on
distributed profits, there were offsetting burdens at the two levels. The
total tax burden on corporate source income was
(2.8) TC =(S+ t )A1—sD
p
while T =nD.This implies ó =(1—rn),but 0 so
(2.9) 6 =(1—m)/(i—s).—32—
For values of the marginal tax rate near the standard rate of incometax, this
tax system is neutral with respect to distribution policy. Forhigher rrirgi—
nal rates, it discriminates against dividends. However, itwas a more favorable
tax system for dividends than eith r of the previous regimes.
1965—1973:ClassicalCorporation Tax
The Labour Victory- in 19614 marked the beginning of harsher taxation
of corporate income. The 1965 Finance Bill introduced a newsystem of cor-
porate taxation parallel to that in the United States. Profits were
taxed at a corporate tax rate,T, and there was no distinction between
retained and distributed earnings. This implies TC =vJ1,and since dTC/dD =
0,0 =1.Shareholders continued to pay dividend taxes at rate m. However,
the shareholder preference ratio was altered by the introduction inearly 1965
of a capital gains tax at a flat rate of 30 percent on all realizedgains.
Each asset wasascribedas a taxable basis its value on 6April1965. We use
z to represent the effective marginal capital gains tax rate, taking
account of the reductions afforded by deferred realization.1-9 The investortax
preference ratio for this tax system is sS= (1—m)/(l—z).Since 0 =1,
0 =(1—m)/(1—z).Unlike the previous tax regime, the classical system made no
attempt to avoid the double taxation of dividends. As a result, the dividend
tax burden was substantially heavier than that under the previoussystem.
1973 —Present:The Imputation System
The Conservative return to power in 1970 set in motion a further set
of tax reforms, directed at reducing the discriminatory taxation of dividend
19Deferred realization is one of thetechniques which enables
American investors to lower their capital gains tax liability. Tradingso as to
generate short—term losses and long—term gains, taking advantage of the dif——33—
income.The current tax system resembles the system which was used between
1958 and l961, with several differences. All corporate profits are taxed at
the corporation tax rate, T When firms pay dividends, they are required to
pay Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) at a rate of Ta per pound of' gross dividends
paid. However, while in the 1958—6k regime this tax on dividends was treated
as a withholding of investor income taxes, under the current regime it is a
prepayment of corporate tax. At the end of its fiscal year, the firm pays
Tdll_TaD in corporate taxes, taking full credit for its earlier ACTpayments.2°
Since total corporate tax payments equal ill, 0 =1under this tax system.
Shareholders receive a credit for the firm's ACT payment. A share-
holder calculates his tax by first inflating his dividend receipts by 1/Cl_Ta)
and then applying a tax rate of m. However, he is credited with tax payments
of •ta/(l_Ta) so his effective marginal tax rate is (m_Ta)/(1_Ta). If his
marginal income tax rate is above Tatheimputation rate, then he isliable
foradditional dividend taxes. Shareholders with marginal tax rates below
tareeligible for tax refunds. a
Theshareholder tax preference ratio under the imputation system is
isgiven by
ferential taxes on the two, is another technique; it is unavailable to British
investors,since the tax rate on allgainsis equal. Step—up of asset basis
at death is another feature of the U.S. tax code which lowers effective capi-
tal gains rates still further. Prior to 1971, estates in the U.K. were sub-
ject to both estate duty and capital gains tax on assets in the estate. Since
1971, however, capital gains liability has been forgiven at death and heirs
become liable for capital gains tax only on the difference between the price
which they- receive when they dispose of the asset, and it's value at the time
of inheritance.
2Oii ITG >TcIl, the firm is unable to fully recover its ACT
payments. The unrelieved ACT" may be carried forward indefinitely and back-
wards for a period of not more than two years. A substantial fraction of






Since U =1,we know U =6and can rewrite this as
(2.11) =
(1—t)(l—z
The imputation rate has typically been set equal to the standard rate of
income tax, the rate paid by riost taxpayers (but not most dividend
recipients). For standard rate taxpayers, the imputation system provides an
incentive for paying dividends; retentions yield taxable capital gains, but
there is essentially no tax on dividends at the shareholder level. For indi-
viduals facing marginal dividend tax rates above the standard rate, there may
be an incentive for retention, provided m >z+Ta(1_Z)•Pension funds and
other untaxed investors have a clear incentive to prefer dividend payments.
For these investors, m =z=0and the tax system provides a sudsidy, since
one pound of dividend income is effectively- worth 11(1_ta) pounds. Finally,
brokers and dealers in securities have a less powerful incentive to encourage
firmstopay dividends. They are allowed to reclaim ACT paid by corporations
in which theyholdshares only up to the amountofACT paid by the brokerage
firm in regard to its dividend distribution. Thus, for many brokers, marginal
dividend receipts cannot be inflated by the 1/(1_ta) factor.
therefore face corporate tax discrimination between retentions and distribu—
tions. See Mayer(1982)and King (1983)forfurther details on the workings
of'ACT.—35—
II.B. SummaryStatistics
Table 2 summarizes the tax parameters for each different tax regime.
It relatesand U to the profits tax rates, investor dividend tax rates, and
capital gains tax rates. Estimates of 6 and e based on weighted—average margi-
nal tax rates are reported in Table 3. The values of m and z which we used to
compute these statistics are weighted averages of the marginal tax rates faced
by different classes of investors, with weights proportional to the value of
their shareholdings. These weighted average tax rates were first calculated by
King (1977) and have been updated in King, Naldrett, and Poterba (l98).
These tax rates are indicative of the major changes in tax policy
which have occurred over time. If one type of investor is in fact "the marginal
investor," then the weighted averages are substantially misleading as indicators
of the tax rates guiding market prices. Even if this is the case, however,
there is still some information in ourtimeseries since the tax burden for most
types of investors moved in the same direction in each tax reform. We present
empirical evidence below suggesting the relevance of weighted average marginal
tax rates.
The time series movements in 6 and U deserve some comment. The
dividend tax burden was heaviest in the 1950—58 and 1965—73 periods, and
lightest in recent years. The most dramatic changes in 6 occur in 1965
(capital gains tax) and 1973 (imputation). For 0, there are additional
changes in 1958 and 1966. These substantial changes raise the prospect of
detecting the effects of dividend taxation on the behavior of individuals and
firms. Similar descriptive statistics for the United States tax system would—36—
Table 2
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Profits Tax 1965 m
i—s
Classical 1966— 1—rn 1—rn
Corporation Tax 1913 i—z l—z
Imputation 1913— 1—rn 1—rn
System (i_ta)(i_z) (1_Ta)(1_z)
Note: See text for further details and parameter definitions.—37—
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1950 0.568 0.000 0.1432 0.6714
1951 0.575 0.000 0.1425 0.619
1952 0.560 0.000 0.14140 0.598
1953 0.5145 0.000 0.1455 0.612
19514 0.530 0.000 o.bo 0.621
1955 0.518 0.000 0.1482 0.6214
1956 0.517 0.000 0.1483 0.596
1957 0.515 0.000 0.1485 0.575
1958 0.502 0.000 0.1498 0.673
1959 0.1488 0.000 0.512 0.807
1960 0.1485 0.000 0.515 0.8140
1961 0.485 0.000 0.515 0.8141
1962 0.14814 0.000 0.516 0.8143
1963 0.1483 0.000 0.517 0.81414
19614 0.509 0.000 0.1491 o.8oi
1965 0.529 0.138 0.550 0.936
1966 0.500 0.1714 o.6o8 0.706
1967 0.1488 0.113 0.619 0.619
1968 0.1483 0.169 0.622 0.622
1969 0.1472 0.157 0.627 0.627
1970 0.1456 0.152 0.6141 0.641
1971 0.141414 0.150 0.6514 0.6514
1912 0.1425 0.1148 0.6714 0.6714
1973 0.214 0.1143 0.916 0.916
19714 0.105 0.133 1.032 0.978
1975 0.0148 0.130 1.094 0.970
1976 —0.0014 0.131 1.156 1.019
1977 —0.031 0.134 1.190 1.055
1978 —0.0140 0.135 1.202 1.070
1979 —0.043 0.136 1.207 1.0141
1980 —0.101 0.1314 1.271 1.0147
1981 —0.120 0.133 1.292
Notes: Column 1 is the weighted average marginal tax rate on allshareholders,
reported b,r King (1977, p.268) and updated by King, Naldrett, and
Poterba (19814). This is the time series for m* = (mT)/(l"T )as
reported in the text. Column 2, the effective capital gains ax
rate, is also drawn from King (1977). Columns 3 and 14 were com-
puted by the authors as descibed in the text. They may not correspond
exactly to calculations based on Columns 1 and 2 since they are averages
of uarter1y ratios.—38--
display far fewer movements in the postwar period, and no dramatic jumps.
The use of legal changes to identify economic relationships is
always problematic since such changes may themselves be endogenous responses
to economic conditions. The hist ry of British corporate tax reform provides
little reason to think that this is an important problem for our empirical
work. Major reforms typically followed elections which brought about changes
in the governing party. For example the 1965 reforms closely followed the
Labour party's victory in the l96I election, and the 1973 reform was a con-
sequence of the Conservative victory in the 1970 elections. A reading of the
press reports suggests that corporate tax reform was not an issue in either
election.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to various tests of how the tax
changes described in this section have influenced Ci) the market's relative
valuation of dividends and capital gains, (ii) the decisions made by firms
with respect to their dividend payout, and (lii) the investment decisions of
British firms.—39—
III. Dividend Taxes and Dividend Valuation
The changes in investor tax rates on dividend income andcapital gains
provide opportunities for testing the "tax irrelevance" viewby examining share
price movements around ex—dividend days. If marginal investors valuedividend
income as much as they value capital gains, then when sharesexperience ex—days
their price should decline by the full amount of the dividendpayment. If the
marginal investors are taxed more heavily on dividends than oncapital gains,
however, then share prices will fall by less than the dividendpayment.
Moreover, if marginal investors are untaxed, then changes in dividend tax
rules should not affect the marginal valuation of dividends andcapital
gains.
Numerous authors, including Elton and Gruber (1970), Black and
Scholes (1973), Green (1980), Kalay (1982), Eades, Hess and Kim(l98I),
Auerbach (1983a), Hess (1982), and others, have used daily data toanalyze
relative share price movements in the United States.Although their results
are controversial, these studies suggest that share prices declineon ex—days,
but by less than the amount of the dividend. These results havebeen
interpreted as confirming the hypothesis that marginal investorsare taxed.
British data provide an opportunity for studying thegeneral issue
of whether taxes affect dividend valuation, as wellas the role of short term
trading in deterniing the ex—dividend day behavior of share prices. As noted
in the last section, there have been substantialchanges in the investor
tax preference ratio during the last twenty—fiveyears. The principal changes
occurred in 1965 and 1973.—40--
There have also been important changes in the tax rates affecting
securities traders involved in tax arbitrage around ex—dividend days. The
most significant changes affecting short term traders were introduced in the
1970 Finance Act.21 Prior to 1970, "dividend stripping" by trading around ex—
days was apparently widespread. Since then, however, the Inland Revenue has
been empowered to levy penalties on investors engaging in securities transac-
tions which are principally motivated by tax considerations. For an indivi-
dual investor, if trading around ex—days (i.e., selling shares before the
ex—day and repurchasing them later) reduces his tax liability by more than 10
percent in any year, the tax savings from these transactions may be voided by
the Inland Revenue.
After 1970, trading by institutions around ex—days could be declared
void if they bought and then sold the same share within one month of its ex—
dividend day. If its transactions are disallowed, the institution could be
required to pay taxes, in spite of its tax—exempt status. Since 1970, a
dealer who trades in a security around its ex—day arid holds his shares for
less than a month will not be able to deduct his full capital loss from
taxable income.22 A fraction of his capital loss, varying inversely with the
holding period, is disallowed for tax purposes. As the holding period decli-
nes to only the ex—day, the fraction disallowed rises to nearly 100 percent.
21The anti—dividend stripping provisions in the1910 Act are
described in Tiley (1978), pp. 761—}, and Kaplanis (1983).
22Miller and Scholes (1982) suggest brokers and dealersas the ex—
day price setters.—41—
The interactions among these tax provisions are difficult to
describe, and the extent to which the Board of Inland Revenue exercised its
authority remains unclear. However, one cannot doubt that the opportunities
for avoiding taxes by trading around ex—days were substantially reduced in
1910. To the extent that trading around ex—days is important in determining
ex—dividend price movements, we would expect to observe noticable changes in
dividend valuation, if at all, only around 1970. This should be contrasted
with the traditional and tax capitalization views, which predict majorchanges
in the relative value of dividends and capital gains when the tax reforms
affecting ordinary investors occurred but none when rules affecting dividend
stripping took place.
III.,A Data and Methods23
To estimate the share price response to dividends, we obtained daily data
on the share prices and dividends of'sixteenlarge U.K. firms. A listing of
the firms in ourdataset and further background data may be found in Poterba
and Summers (19814a). We obtained a listing of ex—dividend dates from the
London Business School Share Price Data Base, and then consulted microfilm
copies of the London Financial Times. The closing share prices on the trading
day before the ex—date and the ex—date itself were recorded for each firm.2l
For each firminthe sample, we included all ex—dates between 1955 and 1981
23The data used in this section aredescribed, and further results
are reported, in Poterba and Summers (1981ta).
2l4The prices used are theaverage of closing bid and asked prices.—42-
corresponding to cash dividend payments which were taxable as ordinary income
and not accompanied by any dividend rights, stock options, or other special
features. Our data set contained 633 ex—days, distributed evenlyamong the
years 1955—81. We also obtained data on the value of the Financial Times
Industrial Ordinary Share index, and used this index to construct a market
return series.






where Rt is the market return, I3o is a firm specific intercept term, IS 8
company—specific coefficient which should resemble the security's beta. The
dividend yield on each day isd.tj where j denotes the year in which the divi-
dend falls. We also estimate (3.1) constraining to be constant across firms.
Both equations were estimated by a generalized least squares procedure
which allowed for heteroscedasticity across different firms. Since therewere
few instances in which two firms had coincident ex—days, we did not need to
correctfor residual correlation across firms.
When two tax regimes occur within one year, we allow for twoj'S
in
that year. Thecoefficients reflect the excess pretax return onex—
dividend days, and therefore correspond to 1—ô for each year. If the "tax
irrelevance" view is correct, then the parameter should not depend upon the
relative tax rates on dividends and capital gains.25 Under the other views we
25The tax changes in l9T3 altered the value of dividend incometo
nonprofit institutions andpersonal investors engaged in tax—free accumulation,
aswell as to naive personal investors paying high marginal dividend taxes.—43—
wouldexpect to vary over time, especially when the Imputationsystem was
Introduced in 1973 but also as the composition of shareholders variesover
time.26
III.B Results
The results of estimating (3.1) are shown in Table 14•Thea coef-
ficients are clearly subject to substantial variability overtime, even when
the tax system does not vary. However, there is a pronounceddrop in the
estimated coefficients beginning in the second half of 1913. There iseven a
clear difference in the estimates for the first and second halves of1973.
This suggests the importance of the 1973 imputation reform inaltering the
relative valuation of dividends and capital gains. The difference in the
average value of tbetweenthe 1965—73 and 1973+ tax regimes is 0.51, which
corresponds very closely to the value of 0.51 computed from the weighted
average marginal tax rates in Table 3.
The estimated coefficients did not change substantially,however,
when the capital gains tax was introduced in 1965. Thismay indicate that
effective marginal capital gains tax rates were actually negligible.
Constantinides (1983) and Stiglltz (1983) have shown that optimalportfolio
strategies can substantially reduce effective capital gains tax rates, so the
For securities dealers and brokers, however, who were unable tofully reclaim
the Advance Corporation Tax on the dividend they received, the taxchange
should have had a smaller effect.
26Approximately 6percentof British equity was held by untaxed
institutions in 1957; by 1980, the fraction had risen to 26percent.—44—
Table 14
The Stock Market's Relative Valuation o' Dividends and Capital Gains: 1955—81
Average Values:
1981
= Oi+iiR + jhjtd1tj j=l956 + "it
The results in Column 1 impose the restriction
column 3 do not impose this restriction. The data
dividend return premia, ((m_ta)/(l_ta) —z)I(i—z) =
weightedaverage tax rates reported in Table 2. See
for further description.
= , alli, while those in
in the last column are the
1 —6,calculated from the
Poterba and Summers (19814a),
Model
Year Without Fixed Effects
Model Average Tax
With Fixed Effects Rate Value
1955 .637 (.1914) .6914 (.198) .518
1956 .1149 (.177) .208 (.181) .517
1957 .1439 (.i6) .501 (.171) .515
1958 .393 (.151) .1451 (.155) .502
1959 .537 (.182) .610 (.187) .1488
1960 .361 (.201) .1414i (.207) .1485
1961 —.1142 (.207) —.056 (.213) .1485
1962 .378 (.1914) .1457 (.199) .14814
1963 .276 (.205) .360 (.210) .1483
19614 .050 (.1714) .105 (.180) .509
1965 .3014(.186)/.5146(.2140) .351(.188)/.589(.2142) .533/.1427
1966 .272 (.150) .300 (.155) .392
1967 .259 (.i148) .301 (.152) .381
1968 .2514 (.190) .308 (.195) .378
1969 .1460 (.i8o) .1499 (.187) .373
1970 .1459 (.151) .518 (.155) .359
1971 .298 (.1145) .339 (.150) .3146
1972 .1455 (.180) .519 (.189) .326
1973 .365(.305)/—.01414(.297) .368(.290)/—.0114(.333) .302/—.109
19714 —.1146 (.160) —.088 (.i66) —.032
1975 —.6oo (.185) —.551 (.192) —.0914
1976 —.031 (.1614) —.005 (.171) —.156
1977 —.109 (.1714) —.072 (.180) —.190
1978 —.115 (.168) —.036 (.1714) —.202
1979 —.056 (.137) —.019 (.1143) —.207







RegimeII(1965—73) .369 .1415 .368
RegimeIII (1973—81) —.1143 —.095 —.1714
Notes:The coefficients in columns 1 and 3 were estimated from the equation:—45-.
naive assumptions of constant turnover probabilitiesused in constructing z in
Table 3 may be substantially incorrect.27
There is also little change in the estimatedcoefficients before and
after 1970, when the ex—day trading restrictionswere introduced. This is
evidence gainst the importance of short—termtrading in determining the beha-
vior of share prices around their ex—days, andwhen coupled with the changes
in valuation around 1973, suggests that viewswhich hold that a weighted
average marginal tax rate affects security market equilibriumare more
accurate descriptions of reality than those whichassume that marginal
investors are broker—dealers.
Whilethe annual ex—day coefficients in Tableare informative
abouthowtaxesmayaffectsecurity values, they are not "tests" in any usual
sense. To test the proposition that the estimates ofreflected tax rates,
we compare our estimate offor each year with (i—o) in Table 3. The
hypothesis that =(i_o),all t, wasrejectedat standard significance
levels,.However, tests of the hypothesis=
(m_ta)/(l_Ta),imposingz.
=0,
didnot reject the null. This again suggests that whileour nasures of capi-
tal gains tax rates may be very imprecise indicatorsof actual tax rates,
underlying variation in dividend tax rates as measuredby our crude weighted
averages is reflected in share price movements.
The results reported here suggest thepotentially substantial
influence of dividend taxation on the stock market'srelative valuation of divi-
dends and capital gains. However, whiledaily share price movements are likely
2TThe capital gains tax rateseries computed by King (1977), which
we report, assumed that shareholders followed apolicy of liquidating ten
percent of their equity holdings each year, regardless of theirtrading gains or
losses. This assumption clearly overstates theliability which would follow—46--
toyield the most precise evidence on dividend valuation, theymaybecon-
taminated by unusual return patterns around ex—daysor other subtle factors.28 i
taxes play an important role in the valuation of dividendincome, then it should
also be possible to detect this phenomenon in asample of monthly security
returns.Miller andScholes(1982)have arguedthat previous monthly studies
usingAmerican data, for example Gordon and Bradford (1980) andLitzenberger and
Ramaswarx' (1979, 1982), were contaminated by information effects and thattheir
discovery of a tax effect was therefore spurious. Monthly dataare of course
subject to other biases, and they are noisier than the daily series.However,
in Poterba and Summers (198la), we usedmonthly British data for the period
1955—81andagain found evidence that tax changes induced movements in divi-
dend valuation.29
The results in this section cast doubt on the value ofthe tax irre—
levance hypothesis in explaining why British firmspay dividends. Although It
Is of course possible that British and American institutionsdiffer in ways
that preclude generalizing from the Britishexperience,this seemsunlikely.
Miller and Scholes (1978), in their analysis of the taxationof dividends In
the United States, suggested that the interaction betweenvarious tax provi-
sions can cause dramatic reductions in the effectivemarginal tax rate on
capital income. They focussed on several devices in the tax code whichmight
from an optimal trading strategy-.
2BSome evidence of unusualreturn patterns around American ex—
daysis reported in Black and Scholes (1973) and Eades, Hess and Kim (1981).
Mas (1981) presents corroborative evidence for the UnitedKingdom.
29Countries besides the UnitedKingdom In which dividend tax
changes have taken place provide a valuable source of informationon the divi-
dend question. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1983) providesome evidence that the
Canadian tax reform of 1971 affected ex—day price behavior ina manner con-.-.47—
reduce the effective dividend tax rate:(1) the potential for dividend income
to raise the limitation on interest incomedeductability; (ii) the availabi-
lity of life insurance policies and single premium annuitiesas essentially-
tax—free accumulation vehicles; and (iii) theuse of pension funds to allow
assets to earn the before—tax interest rate.3°
Whilesome of the relevant tax features appear in the British tax
code, others do not. Interest payments are not deductible fromtaxable income
in the United Kingdom, except in special circumstancesinvolving home mortga-
ges and several other minorcases.Moreover, there are strict (and quite low)
limits on the amount deductible. The first Miller—Scholesdevice is therefore
inaccessible to British investors. The life insurancemechanism, however, may
be more powerful as a tax avoidance device in Britainthan in the United
States. Tax subsidies are provided for thepayment of insurance premia, and
the proceeds of the policies are generallyexempt from capital gains.3- Tiley
(1978) observes that
"in recent years, these [insurance tax subsidiesihave been
used to promote tax avoidance schemes...taxpayerstook
advantage of the rules concerning relief from premiums to
buy shares or unit trusts with, in effect, the aid ofan
exchequer subsidy, or higher rate taxpayers put their assets
sistent with the short—term trading hypothesis,Amoaku—Adu (1983) and Khoury
and Smith (1977) provide opposing evidence,however, showing that share values
and dividend policies responded as predictedby the "weighted average of
investors" model. Further work remains to be doneon this question.
30Although in principle all of these devicescould generate
substantial tax savings for personal investors, theextent to which they are
actually used in the United States remains controversial.Feenberg (1981),
for example, showed that investors for whom the interestdeductability limita-
tion was binding received only 2.5 percent of totaldividend payments in
1977.
31A muchmore complete account of life insurance taxation ispro- vided inTiley(1978),Chapter3.Arelated discussionof pensionaccumulation isfoundin Chapter 36.—48—
intofunds where income could accumulatevirtually free of taxthanks to Itax] concessions for insurance
companies. (p.7l7J"
Finally, with regard to pension funds, the British andAmerican systems are
similar. Corporate Contributions are deductible forcorporate tax purposes,
and individual pension contributionsare not treated as taxable income.
Pensionfunds are untaxed,and the earnings of pension funds are taxexempt.
When pension income isreceived during retirement it is subject toordinary
incometaxation. As in the United States, the issue ofwhether marginal
investors are accumulating through these channelsis unclear. There maybe
other devices for sheltering income, availablein the United Kingdom butnot
inthe United States, which we have failed tomention. These would only
strengthen ourcaseshowing that the potential for tax free accumulation is
clearly present in Britain.
Before presenting additional evidence todistinguish between the tax
capitalizationhypothesisand traditional view of dividendtaxes, we turn in
the next section to an alternativexuethodo1or for studying the impact of tax
changeson the market valuation of dividends. This willprovide further
information on whether the stock market exhibitsa preference for dividends or
capitalgains.—49—
IV. AssetPrice Changes and Tax Announcements
Ex—dayevidence is only one way of trying to nasure the effectof
tax changes. Another involves the "event study"methodolor which Is often
used to investigate the effects ofregulatory reforms, mergers, or other
financialnews on corporate valuation. By looking for changes in shareprices
when major tax reforms were announced or whenexpectations were otherwise
altered, we can derive further tests for the Influence oftaxes on asset
valuation.
Using results in Section I, note that the value of ashare, V, can





where is the after tax return required by themarginal investor in period
k and Is the dividend in period j paid to the owners of allcurrently
outstanding shares. It follows immediately from (.i) thatignoring future
equity issues, a permanent change in the dividend taxrate, through its effect
on S, will cause an equal proportional reduction in the value of allfirms.
This holds regardless of the time path of theirexpected future dividends.
However equation (1.i) makes it clear that atemporary change in dividend
taxes will impact differently on different firms.Temporary changes in divi-
dend taxes will have their greatest impact on firms whichare expected to
distribute a large amount of dividend income in the immediatefuture. In the
extreme case of a firm that was not expected topay any dividends for the
duration of a tax change, the change would haveno effect on market value.—50—
In practice, the fluidity of tax policy leaves some ambiguity as to
whether a particular policy Is (i) temporary and likely to be reversed, or (ii)
the first step in a program of escalating reform. These two possibilities
have distinctly different implications for the impact of a tax increase on the
share values of different firms. If higher dividend taxes are expected to be
short—lived, then low yielding firms which are valuable primarily because of
dividends projected to be paid in the distant future will experience smaller
share price declines than high yielding firms which derive most of their value
from a high level of current dividends. Alternatively, if the increase in
dividend taxes is viewed as the harbinger of still higher tax rates in the
future, then low yielding firms will decline by more than those with high
yields, as the market expects heavy taxes now, but even heavier taxes during
the time period when these firms finally distribute their profits.
Most of the tax changes during our sample period were clearly tem-
porary. In 1958, when the split—rate corporate profits tax was abolished and
replaced by a single rate tax which was much more favorable towards dividend
payout, support for the measure came from the Conservative Party. Labour was
opposed, and the possibility that the tax change would be reversed when the
opposition gained control of Parliament was recognized clearly. Indeed,
that was what happened. In l961, Labour won a narrow victory and promptly
announced a new plan to raise taxes on capital income by adopting a corporation
income tax system which would effectively "double—tax" dividend payments.
Support for this policy again was split clearly along party lines. When the
Conservatives regained power in 1970, it was not long before plans were—51—
announced(in the 1971 Budget) for a return toan integrated tax system which
would substantially reduce the tax burden on dividends.
If dividend tax reforms are perceived as temporary and thestock
market equates the value of each share with the present value of itsafter—tax
dividend stream, then increases in the dividend tax rate shouldreduce the
value of high payout shares by a larger amount thanlow—payout shares. This may
be tested by relating the excess return on different firmsduring budget
announcement months to each firm's typical dividend yield. Evidence that divi-
dend tax increases reduce the value of high—yield sharesby xrre than they
reduce low—yield share prices would constitutestrong evidence against the "tax
irrelevance" hypothesis.
IV.A Data and Methods
Our study focuses on three events which substantially affectedthe
outlook for British dividend taxation. They are described below:
pril, 1958 Budget Speech: Chancellor Heathcoat Ainory announced
reforms in the profits tax, abolishing the differential 30% taxon distributed
profits and the 3% tax on undistribtited earnings. Effective 1April 1958
(retroactively), he introduced a single—rate profits tax of 10percent. This
reform was not fully anticipated; The Economist (19 April 1958) indicatedthat
Mr. Amory had shown "political courage" in adopting it.During April 1958,
the excess return on the market, calculated as the totalreturn on the
Financial Times —ActuariesShare Index, minus the Treasury Bill rate, was 1.7
percent. Over the longer February to April period when expectationsmay have
been changing the excess market return was 7.3percent.—52—
November, 1961k Mini—Budget: After Labour's electoral victory in
October, 1961, Chancellor James Callaghan announced sweeping plans for fiscal
reform. These included the switch to a classical system of corporate income
taxation beginning in 1966 and the imposition of a capital gains tax beginning
in April, 1965. The two proposals should have had opposite effects on
dividend—paying firms. Introducing a capital gains tax should have raised the
value of dividend income, helping high payout firms. The switch to a cor-
poration tax system however, and the repeal of the integrated tax system which
had prevailed between 1958 and 19614, imposed a heavier tax burden on high
dividend firms than on high retentions companies. This was reflected in the
large change in 0 calculated in Section II. The general move toward heavier
taxation was recognized as one cause of the stock market's 1•7 percent excess
return during the month of November 19614.
March, 1911 Budget Speech: This was the first Budget speech after the
Conservativevictory of 1970. Chancellor Barber announced plans to end "the
substantial discrimination in favour of retained as opposed to distributed
profits"by adopting a new system of corporation tax which would impute cor-
porate tax payments to shareholders. The budget also promised substantial
reductions in the marginal tax rates applicable to investment income received by
personal investors, and should therefore have proved highly attractive for firms
with currently high dividend payout. The excess return on the overall market
during March 1971 was 6. percent.
To test for the effects of tax changes on different firms, we genera-
lized the monthly after—tax CAPM used by Gordon and Bradford (1980) and
Poterba and Summers (19814a) to include terms which would capture the—53—







whered* is the average dividend yield on a security during theprevious twenty—
four months, and 'kit is an indicator variabl which is set equal to one if' the
it—thobservation corresponds to a month in the first, second, or third "tax
regime." Tax Regime I is defined to include observations prior to the intro-
duction of a capital gains tax in 1965. Tax Regime 2 extends from 1965to
1973,whentheimputation system took effect, and Tax Regime 3is the period
after April, 1973.This equation is a modified CAPM which takesaccount of
possiblydifferential valuation of dividends and capital gains,allowing for
changes when major tax reforms occur. Poterba and Summers (19814a) estimate
several models of this type and provide a fuller justification for thespecifi-
cation.
The critical variables for our present study are the last terms in
equation (14.2). 'sit is an indicator variable for the months involving major
tax reform announcements, where s =14/58,11/614, or 3/71. The coefficients
n15 and capture the effects of tax announcements on security returns, with
reflecting differences which can be attributed to average dividend yield.
If a tax reform, say that in 1958, raised the value of high—yieldshares, then
we would predict that fl21958 would be positive. The corresponding coef-
ficient for 1971 should also be positive, and it is difficult topredict the
sign of the 19614 announcements because they involved changes in both dividend
and capital gains taxes.
The data set we used for our study is a sample of over 140,000
company—months of security returns, drawn from the London Business School—54—
Share Price Data Base. A more complete description of this data setmay be
found in Poterba and Summers (19814a).
IV.B Results
The results of estimating €uation (14.2) on this monthly data set are
reported in Table 5. We show both the 111 and coefficients in the table,
and show results from several different definitions of the "event period"during
which information was revealed. For example, the first row of the table
corresponds to a one—month event period. That is, I. is equal to 1 only
during the month of the tax policy announcement.Since expectations were pro-
bably evolving throughout the period immediately prior to the actual policy
announcement, in particular in election months as in 19614, we also consider
somewhat longer event periods. Two— and four—month event period specifications
are also reported in Table 5. In all cases, we define the event period as
ending in the announcement month. Many previous studies of "events" and their
effects on share prices have suggested that the market quickly adjusts tonew
information, so allowing for adjustment in the months after the budget speeches
seemed unnecessary.32
The results in Table 5 provide some support for the view that antici-
pated taxes are reflected in security prices. In 1958, firms with high dividend
yields experienced substantially greater returns during the period around the
budget speech than their low—yield counterparts.A one percentage point
increase in a firm's dividend yield would have induced a four percent higher
32me longtradition of evidence for rapid market adjustment dates toFama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969).—55—
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Constant —.0214 .001 —.017
(.028) (.010) (.007) 1Month
Dividend 14.3014 .030 1.1466
Yield (5.352) (3.3814) (2.002)
Constant —0.019 —0.006 —.0170
(.016) (.007) (.00714) 2 Months
Dividend 14.981 1.860 1.14614
Yield (3.815) (i.814i) (2.003)
Constant —.019 —.002 —.008
(.016) (.005) (.005)
14 Months
Dividend 14.982 .188 1.0142
Yield (3.816) (1.193) (1.3814)
Predicted
Dividend + + Yield
Effect





usinga data set ofinnthly share returnscompiled from the London Business School Share Price Data Base. See Poterba andSummers(19814a) for a more detaileddescription of this data set and the text for further details on the
variable definitions. Standard errors are reported inparentheses.—56—
return during the month of April, 1958.Similarly,in 1971, the estimated
dividend yield coefficients are positive in allestimated equations. They
suggest that when comparing two firms, one with a dividendyield one point
higherthan the other, the high yield firm would haveearned a return about
oneand one—half percentage points greater than thatof the low—yield firm.
Unfortunately, none of the estimated coefficients issignificantly different
from zero at the 95percentconfidence level. This mayinpart reflect the
difficulties of identifying the times when new informationwas revealed, as
well as the inherent imprecision associated withthe use of monthly data.
The 19614 budget speech hadmuch weaker effects on the differential
returnsbetween high and low payout firms. The one— andfour—month event
variableshave tiny coefficients, and the somewhatlarger 2-month variable,
whichincludes both the event month for the budgetspeech and the previous
month, when the election took place, has a larger coefficientbuta t—statistic
onlyslightlygreater than one. This event, as we noted above, had effectson
both the tax treatment of high and low—payoutshares. Under the assumption that
capitalgains taxeswere paid at veryloweffective rates, however, the reform
shouldhave reduced the value of high—yield firms. Itremains somewhat
surprising that this effect does not leave astronger trace in the data.
Oneof the major difficulties inany event study is identifying the
times when information was actually revealed tomarket participants. To the
extent that conditional upon electoral outcomes,budget proposals were easy to
anticipate, the elections ofl961 and 1970 mayhavebeen the important "events"
forthe revaluation of different securities.Weexperimented with these events,
as well astheactual budget speeches, in our empirical work. andagain found—57—
small revaluation effects, generally in the predicted directions, around elec-
tion periods.
The weak evidence in this section confirms the conclusion of the pre-
ceding section that changes in the tax rules facing typical investors have
important effects on the market valuation of dividends. As discussed at the
end of the last section, this conclusion is probably applicable to the U.S. as
well as Britain. We therefore are led to reject the tax irrelevance view as a
model for analyzing the role of dividend taxes. In the next two sections, we
examine the two remaining views of the effects of dividend taxation.—58—
V.Dividend Taxes and Corporate Dividend Policy
The evidence presented in the last two sections suggests that divi-
dend tax changes alter the stock market's relative valuation of dividends and
capital gains. It constitutes a partial refutation of the "tax irrelevance"
view,which argues that tax avoidance by individuals, coupled with ex—day
trading by brokers and institutions, should eliminate any tax—induced
valuation effects. However, the finding that taxes influence security returns
does not enable us to distinguish between the "tax capitalization" and the
"traditional"views of dividend taxation. Both assume that dividend taxes are
capitalized into share prices and reflected in market returns. These two
views differ in their predictions about how dividend tax changes will affect
corporatefinancial and investment decisions. The tax capitalization view
suggests that neither financial nor real choices will be influenced by a
reductionin dividend taxes, while the traditional view predicts that both the
payoutratio and the level of corporate investment will respond to a tax
reform.In the next two sections, we examine the direct effects of postwar
British dividend tax changes, first on corporate dividend payout and then on
real investment decisions.
The tax capitalization view derived corporate dividend payments as a
residual, the difference between current profits and the firm's investment
demands. Assuming that allinvestmentcould be financed from retained ear-
nings, we showed in Section I that a permanent dividendtax reduction would
notaffect the firm's investment decisions. Funds for investment are already
inside the firm and therefore subject to eventual dividend taxation.While a—59—
permanent reduction in dividend taxes raises the value of these claims on
resources within the corporate sector, it does not alter the rules for
investing these resources so as to maximize the firm's value. Since dividend
taxation affects neither investment, the capital stock, nor current profitabi-
lity, It cannot have any effect on D =(1—i)n—I.The tax irrelevance view
suggests that changes in the investor tax preference ratio should have no
effect on corporate payout decisions. Discriminatory corporate taxes,
however, could alter the level of dividend payments, since they cannot be
laundered by tax—conscious investors.
The traditional view, by comparison, predicts that any permanent
change in the effective marginal dividend tax rate will affect corporate
payout decisions. Dividend policy is chosen by balancing the marginal reduc-
tion in the firm's value due to higher investor tax liabilities against the
marginal increase in value due to changes in the rturn, p(D/(l—'r)ll),
required by investors. A dividend tax reduction will lower the cost of
obtaining further reductions in the required return and therefore should
increase the firm's payout ratio.
The effects of a temporary reduction in the dividend tax are
somewhat different. In the tax capitalization view, the cost of capital
depends on the expected change in the equilibrium value of marginal q. Just
before an increase in the dividend tax, firms will anticipate capital losses
from holding corporate capital, and will reduce their investment activity. By
reducing I but leaving fl(K) unchanged, such a change in investment activity
would raise the observed dividend payout ratio of the corporate sector.—60—
Similarly, immediately prior to a dividend tax reduction, firms wouldexpect
to gain substantially from the upward revaluation of marginalq, and would
therefore invest. This would lead to a reduction in dividendpayments prior
to a dividend tax cut.
The traditional view also predicts changes in payout ratios as a
resultof temporary dividend tax reductions. However, temporary andpermanent
changes would cause the same proportionate reduction in dividend payout, since
thefirst order condition for optimal dividend choice, equation (l.17a),
depends only- on current values of the tax parameters.This conclusion
depends critically upon the assumption that capital 1narketpartic1pants-se
only the current period's dividend yield in choosing the appropriate discount
rate for the firm's earnings.
If instead investors chose p on the basis of theaverage dividend
yield for a few adjacent periods, then the firm would be able to raise its
value by altering the timing of its dividend payments. For example, if the
discount rate is determined by the value of (ZD)/(E(l—t)ll) during a several—
quarter period, then the firm could raise its dividend payments during the
less heavily taxed period, compensating for this with a reduction in dividend
payout during high—tax periods, and could raise its total value. This would
induce swings in dividend policy around the introduction oftemporary dividend
tax changes, as well as when permanent but anticipated dividend taxeswere
introduced. The tax irrelevance view predicts dividend re—timing when the
corporate tax rules change, but predicts no effect of personal tax reforms.
V.A Data and Methods
To test the payout predictions of the different views, we examined—61—
theaggregate payout behavior of Britain's Industrial and Commercial
Companies. The tests reported in this section employ seasonally unadjusted
data on gross dividend payments and corporate profits. We draw heavily on
Poterba (19Sla), where the data are described in greater detail.In the
United States, the dividend payout ratio is defined as the ratio of dividend
payments, before personal tax, to corporate profits after corporate tax. In
Britain, this definition is misleading because corporate taxes, hence after—
tax profits, depend upon the firm's payout policy when a non—classical cor-
porate tax system is in effect. The dividend payout concept which we employ
is the ratio of gross dividends paid to the maximum feasible gross dividends
of the firm.33 This definition ensures that movements in the payout ratio
measure changes in the fraction of their dividend paying capacity which firms
are using, and not changes in the corporate tax treatment of dividends. Under
atax system like that in the U.S., itis equivalent to the standard measure
ofthe payout ratio.
Explicitdividend controls were in force for much of the 1970s, and
they substantially reduced the gross dividends paid by the Industrial and
Commercial companies. The presence of dividend controls can contaminate any
investigation of the relationship between dividends, profits, and the tax
code. To avoid these difficulties, we report regression results for two
33misis one of the dividend payout concepts suggested by
Feldstein (1970).
Evidencein Poterba(l981a) suggests as much as a fifty percent
reductionin desired dividends.—62—
separate time periods. The first, 1955—1972, is prior to the introduction of
dividend controls. The second sample period includes thepre—control period
as well as data for 1980—1983, the period after the dividend controls had been
lifted. In using data for 1980—83 allow for the possibility of structural
change in the payout relation by adding a dummy for the post 1980 period.
The equation that we estimate is:
(5.1) loD = +1lOD
+21°t_14
+31°t + 1og(Y1/y)
+ 85lOO+6°t÷i + 7tlOgO+
Ut
whereD denotes gross dividends, Y equals maximumfeasibledividends, and 0 is
the total tax preference ratio. Lagged dividend andprofit terms are included
to allow for flexible adjustment dynamics toward the newsteady state. The
estimated equations also include seasonal dummy variables. Theequation was
estimatedboth byOLS and with a maximum likelihoodcorrection for second—
orderserialcorrelation; the results were not particularly sensitive to the
specificationofthe disturbance term.
V.B Results
Estimates of equation (5.1) are reported in Table 6.Theyclearly
demonstrate the importance of dividend taxes in determining the extentto
which firms utilize their dividend—paying capacity. Equations estimated
without any allowance for short—run adjustments in dividendpolicy around tax
changes suggest long run dividend payment elasticities with respect to the
total tax preference ratio of between 2.6 and 1.8, dependingon the specifica-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































induce short—run adjustments in dividend payout. An anticipated tenpercent
increase in the tax preference ratio, corresponding toroughly a four percent
reduction in the shareholder tax rate on dividends, causes dividends tofall
by eight percent of their planned value in the quarter immediately prior to
the tax reform. Moreover, there Is a somewhat smallertransitory increase in
the level of dividend payments immediately after a tax change is instituted.
Controlling for short—term adjustments in payout policy alters the estimated
steady—state effects of a dividend tax change. The long—run elasticity of
dividend payout with respect to the tax preference ratio declines to between
1.03 and 2.05 in the dividend equations which incorporate changes in the tax
rates.
The dividend equations estimated for the early sample period,
1955—72, yield plausible models of the elasticity of dividends withrespect to
profits. They indicate a long—run elasticity of gross dividends withrespect
to maximumfeasible dividends of between .5and .8, andthe hypothesis that
thiselasticity is unity can never be rejected. Less plausible resultsemerge
from the regression models which include post—1980 data. Estimates of the
long—run maximum dividend elasticity are substantially lover than those for
the earlier sample, and negative estimates are obtained in two of the four
reported equations. The hypothesis that this elasticity is unity still cannot
be rejected, however, in either of the equations which were estimated withan
AR2 error structure. Poterba (198ia) suggests that the low maximum dividend
elasticities are probably due to divergences between accountingprofits and
real profits at the end of the sample period. Accounting profitsare used in—65—
the construction of maximumfeasible dividends.
The evidence on dividend payout and tax policy reported above did
not distinguish between changes in the investor tax preference ratio and the
effect of varying corporate tax rates on retained and distributed earnings.
The tax capitalization and traditional view predict that changes in either of
these tax parameters should affect dividend payout, while the "tax
irrelevance" view suggests that only corporate tax changes should affect divi-
dends.Poterba (l981a) tests the hypothesis that investor tax preference
changes affect dividend payout. Although the effect of corporate tax changes
can be estimated ire precisely than investor tax effects, both types of tax
reforms influence corporate dividend decisions. This provides further evi-
dence against the tax irrelevance hypothesis, aswell as the capitalization
view,and buttresses the traditional view of dividend taxation.
The British time—series data is not the only source of variation in
dividend tax rates.35 American dividend taxes were substantially lower before
World War II, and particularly before 1936, than in subsequent years. Brittain
(1966) and Poterba and Summers (19814b) document that changes in weighted
average marginal tax rates on dividends in the U.S. have a significant impact
on corporate dividend policies. Brittain (1966) concluded that "risingindi-
vidual tax rates [between 1920 and 19601 were found to depress dividends.
Most estimates showed [theyl were sufficient to account for the pronounced
downward trend in payout, that which occurred between the late 1920s and the
early postwar period.[p.l96l" This finding provides furtherevidencein
35A numberof studies have demonstrated that British tax reforms
haveinfluenced payout policy. These include Feldstein (19T0), King (1971,
197T), and Pane (1975).—66—
favor of the traditional view of dividend taxes. In Poterba and Summers
(l98lb),we argue that the failure of dividend payout ratios to rise over the
past 15 years is strong evidence against Miller and Scholes' (1978, 1982) claim
that the U.S. income tax has evolved towards a consumption tax.—67—
VI. Investment Behavior and Dividend Taxes
The evidence in the last section focused on the direct linkages bet-
ween tax rates and dividend payout. One of the principal mtivations for our
interest iii dividend taxes, however, was their possible impact on corporate
investment decisions. In this section we summarize the results of Poterba and
Summers (1983) on the relationship between "Tobin's q" and the investment beha-
vior of British firms. This allows us to obtain further evidence on the dif-
ference between the traditional and the tax capitalization views.
These two views predict different steady state values of the ratio of
the market value of corporate equity divided by its replacement cost. Because
the level of investment activity can be shown to depend upon the difference bet-
ween the current value of q and Its steady state level, the two views yield dif-
ferent specifications for the investment function.
In Section I, we derived the value of marginal q predicted by the
tax capitalization view. Under a classical corporate tax regime similar to
that prevailing in the United States, q =(1—m)/(l—z).Managers ask "will
this project raise share values by as much as it reduces the after—tax divi-
dend income of shareholders" and they undertake some investment projects which
do not raise the firm's value by the project's full cost. In equilibrium,
therefore, the market value of the firm will equal (1—m)/(1.-z) times the repla-
cement value of the firm's assets. In contrast, under the traditional view,
the equilibrium value of marginal q is always unity. If marginal and
average q are equai,6 the total value of the firm will therefore equal the
full replacement cost of its capital in place.
6Hayashi (1982) presents the formal conditions for equality bet-
ween the average and marginal values of q.—68--
VI.AData andMethods
As argued by Keynes (1936) and Tobin (1969), andjustified formally
in the context of an adjustment cost modelby Hayashi (1982) and Sutmners
(1981), the level of investment will depend on thedeviation of Tobin's q from
its equilibrium value, qe• Thus, it is natural topostulate that:
(6.i) =i(.
—qe)
where V/pK is the ratio of the market value ofa firm to its replacement
cost, or "'robin's q." Since alternative views about dividendtaxes have dif-
fering implications for the level of qe by comparing alternativespecifica-
tions of qe in (6.1) we can in principle distinguishthese views.
Before turning to the empirical estimates,one additional complication
remains. Our discussion so far has ignored debt financeand corporate taxes.
In Poterba and Summers (1983) we show how theseconsiderations influence qe under
the alternative investment models. Inparticular, we show that the








whereu is the present value of all depreciation allowances andinvestment
incentives on a one pound investment, tisthe corporate tax rate on retained
earnings, b is the fraction of investment financed withdebt, and B is the pre-
sent value of remaining depreciation allowanceson existing capital. The only—69—
difference between the two equations Is that the tax capitalization hypothesis
implies the presence of a term i/8 multiplying the market value of equity,
correcting for the effects of tax capitalization in affecting the firm's
investment decisions.
The investment imde1s which we estimate take the simple form







These specifications are derivet and explained in greater detail in Poterba and
Summers (1983), where the .nterpretedas a random shock to the cost—of—
adjustment function. The appea of the "q" investment approach is that while
other approaches to estimating :1e investment impact of personal taxes require
us to specify the firm's cost of capital, the "q" formulation does not. Since
the investor's discount rate p enters the cost of capital and is unobservable,
efforts to define the cost of capital are prone to error.
Our first tests of the two views are based on comparisons of the fit
of (6.4) and(6.).Becauseallfirmsmay not be on the same margin, the aggre-
gate investment function might be a weighted average of the capitalization and
the traditional investment functions. In order to allow for this possibility
we also specified an investment equation with a weight of a on (6.5)and(i—a)






whereL is the lag operator. The traditional view of the dividend tax is
supported y estimates of & near unity. If, howeveris close to zero, then
tax capitalization would appear to be the sore appropriate model forinvestment
decisions.
To estimate these models, we used annual data on the Industrial
and Commercial Companies in Great Britain for the period 1950—1980. Ourinvest-
ment variable, I/K, is the gross investment rate for thesecompanies. The
values of and TC were constructed using financial market data providedtr
the Bank of England. Tax rates were measured using theweighted average
marginal tax rates which were described in Section II.
VI.B Results
The results of estimating investment models with both sets of Q
variables are shown in Table T. They are based on revised data and
therefore d!ffer (trivially) from earlier findings in Poterba and Summers
(1983). The findings demonstrate the superiority of the Qspecification based
on the "traditional view" of dividend taxation. In each regression pair, the
equation fits better than the specification. In addition, the
models suggest a larger effect of Q on investment activity. These results
favoring the traditional model are buttressed by other specifications reported
in Poterba and Summers (1983).
The most direct test of the two models comes from estimating the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(6.7) = 6.V + (11.28+l.16L) F (i ) I + C
(.21) (.I2) (.i2) t
SSR =1ao B2=.68
Thehypothesis that a =1cannot be rejected at standard significance levels,
suggesting that we cannot reject the traditional view's investment equation.
The point hypothesis that a0, corresponding to tax capitalization view, is
however decisively rejected by the investment data. It appears that the bulk
of investment decisions are made by corporations who act as if marginal
investment is financed through new share issues.
This finding confirms the analysis in the preceding section
suggesting that the traditional view of dividend taxes is nst consistent with
the British experience. It does not appear that firms lower their investment
thresholds when they canfinanceinvestment outofretained earnings as
suggested by the tax capitalization hypothesis.-.73—
VII. Conclusions
Our empirical tests using data on security returns, payout behavior,
and investment decisions all point to a common conclusion. The traditional
view of dividend taxes, which regards them as an additional corporate tax bur-
den, provides the best approximation to their effects. We are led to reject
models of the economic effects of dividend taxes which suggest that dividend
payments have no adverse tax consequences, as well as those which argue that
firms pay dividends because money is "trapped" within the corporate sector.
While these conclusions are based on British data, our comparison of the tax
laws in Britain and the United States suggests that they are likely to be
applicable in the Anierican context as weii.3T
Our results have important implications for tax policy as well as
dividend policy and valuation. They imply that the total tax burden on cor-
porate income includes both corporate taxes arid dividend and capital gains
taxes levied on corporate shareholders. In an economically meaningful sense,
dividends are double—taxed. A reduction in dividend tax rates would increase
dividend payout and corporate investment, and lower firms' cost of capitai.8
A further implication of these results is that estimates of the total
3TOur analysis is corroborated by the work of Long (l9T8) and
Poterba (l98lb) on the valuation of securities issued by the Citizens
Utilities Company. Due to a quirk in the tax law this company was allowed to
issue both shares with taxable and nontaxable dividends. Long (19T8) shows
that the taxable securities sell for more than the nontaxable securities.
Poterba (l98lib) shows using ex—day evidence that marginal investors in taxable
shares appear to be taxed. These facts can only be reconciled in terms of a
dividend preference model, implicitly the traditional view.
8Th1s suggests an important difficulty with many previous stu-
dies of investment behavior. Most of the econometric studies proceeding within
the flexible accelerator framework pioneered by Jorgenson (1963) and Hall arid
Jorgenson (196T) has ignored the role of personal tax variables. While this
omissionmay not be too important for the United States, where tax rates on—74—
tax burden on corporate capital income which assume that dividendtaxes do not
have a marginal impact on retentions—financed investment, suchas the calcula-
tions in Auerbach (1983c) and King and Fullerton (l98),significantly
understate the tax burden on corporate income. Estimates suchas those
reported by Jorgenson and Sullivan (1983) and Hulten and Wykoff (1983), which
ignore dividend taxation entirely, are similarly flawed. The empirical
question of which dividend tax rate to use in calculating effectivecorporate
tax rates is difficult to answer with any precision. However,our findings in
Section III suggest that the weighted average approach usedby King(1977),
Feldstein and Summers (1979), and Feldstein, Dicks—Mireaux, and Poterba (1983)
may be satisfactory. Taking this approach renders invalid the frequently—
quoted conclusion that the United States no longer taxes corporate investment
income.
Our results also suggest that measures directed at providing dividend
tax relief would reduce the inefficiencies associated with the doubletaxation
of corporate capital income. These inefficiencies include distortions inthe
allocation of capital between corporate and noncorporateuses, distortions in
the choice between present and future consumption, distortions incorporate
financial policy,39 and distortions in the allocation of riskbearing. In con-
sidering the merits of dividend tax relief, however, it isnecessary to weigh
these efficiency gains against the equity effects and theefficiency costs of
shareholders have evolved slowly over time, it is potentially critical for
modelling investment in Britain or other nations in which radical tax changes
have taken place.
39Estimates of the intersectoral distortions due tocapital
income taxation are found in Harberger (1962) and Fullerton, etal. (1981).
For evidence on distortions in Intertemporal choices,see Feldstein (1978) and
Summers (1981).—75—
alternative revenue sources.
Miller and Scholes (1978) argue that the failure of the business com-
munity to strongly support Carter administration proposals calling for dividend
tax relief constitutes evidence that dividend taxes are not burdensome. We
would suggest the alternative hypothesis that this failure is attributable to
the same agency problems which lead shareholders to require dividend payments
inthe first instance. Dividend payments are the shareholders' way of moni-
toring nnagers. When dividend taxes are reduced, shareholders find monitoring
cheaperand domore of it. The failure of corporate nnagers to lobby for
dividend relief reflects their decision to lobby for their own rather than
their shareholder's interest. An alternative possibility is that managers saw
dividend relief as an alternative to even more attractive forms of corporate
taxreduction.
Our analysis has abstracted from two important aspects of reality,
clienteleeffects and firms' use of debt finance. Neither of these abstrac-
tions accounts for our qualitative conclusions. Evidence presented by Blume,
Crockett, and Friend (19Th) and Lewellen, et. al. (1978) suggests that clien-
tele effects are not large. Clienteles might attenuate the burden of dividend
taxes, but would not eliminate it unless taxpaying investors held only zero
dividend stocks. The data clearly reject this possibility. With respect to
debt finance, it would be straightforward to append to our formulation of the
firm's decision problem either a "Miller model," as in Miller (19T7), or a
debt—capacity model (as in Gordon and Malkiel (1981)) in which bankrupty risk
limited debt—equity ratios. Neither approach would alter our conclusions.—76—
Nonetheless, it would be valuable to analyze the effects of' dividend taxation in
a richer nodel than the one we have presented here.
Our findings suggest the importance of providing botha theoretical
motivation for, and empirical nasures of, the investors' "dividendpreference
function." Theoretical explanations might be further developedalong the
lines of the incentive signalling approach to corporate finance. While
models explaining why dividends are paid have beensuggested, this work has not
yet reached the point of generating empirically falsifiable predictions about
the effects of varying dividend yields, either across timeor across firms, on
required returns.
The nost promising direction for empirical researchappears to
involve examining the effects of dividend yield on therequired return of
dividend paying firms, during periods when dividends are not paid)0The
extent to which it is appropriate to control for risk in sucha calculation is
unclear, since higher yields may reduce required returns precisely because
they reduce risk. We are currently pursuing research along these lines.
'OElton, Gruber, and Rentzler (1983)report some investigations
along these lines.—77—
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